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There is a fundamental problem with Hume's account 
of the origin of society as given in the Treatise. 1 In 
addition to problems concerning various aspects of law 
and property, Hume is inconsistent in his account of 
the origin of society and the reasons for its continued 
existence. Though the problem of the pre-social state 
seems unimportant at first, it will come to be seen as 
of great importance in Hume's descriptive project. 
Hume takes great pains in the Treatise to stress 
that the state of nature as envisioned by either Hobbes 
or Rousseau could not have ever existed, that its ex-
istence is in fact a "mere," "idle," and "philosophi-
cal" fiction—or does he? 
But if it be found, that nothing can be more sim-
ple and obvious than that rule; that every 
parent, in order to preserve peace among his 
children, must establish it; and that these first 
rudiments of justice must every day be improv'd, 
as the society enlarges: If all this appear evi-
dent, as it certainly must, we may conclude, that 
'tis utterly impossible for men to remain any 
considerable time in that savage condition, which 
precedes society . . . . 2 
From this it seems that Hume claims that what I will 
call the pre-social state could have existed for only a 
short while. Consider, however, the comments immedi-
ately following the last quotation: 
. . . but that his very first state and situation 
may justly be esteem'd social. This, however, 
hinders not, but that philosophers may, if they 
please, extend their reasoning to the suppos'd 
state of nature; provided they allow it to be a 
mere philosophical fiction, which never had, and 
never cou'd have any reality . . . . This state 
of nature, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere 
fiction, not unlike that of the golden age. 1 
From these latter quotations it would seem that Hume is 
denying even the possibility of a pre-social state. 
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This is not, given Hume's account of society, as 
strange as it initially seems. It seems an obvious 
fact that, if primitive society is created by the com-
ing together of male and female for breeding, very few, 
if any, human beings have ever been divorced from this 
society altogether, as they either participated in it 
or were a result of it (see n. 7 below). But this is 
not what Hume means. He means to say that the more ad-
vanced society—where parents institute rules and 
people band together—is the condition in which man 
finds himself, and the state previous to this, or at 
least previous to a slightly more primitive society, is 
impossible—a fiction. 
This claim initially provides no problems for 
Hume's theory. Where it does provide problems is when 
Hume attempts to show why acts contrary to private in-
terest are nonetheless performed. They are performed 
because, says Hume, 
. . . every individual person must find himself a 
gainer, on ballancing the account; since, without 
justice, society must immediately dissolve, and 
every one must fall into that savage and solitary 
condition, which is infinitely worse than the 
worst situation that can possibly be suppos'd in 
society.* 
Elsewhere in the Treatise* Hume argues the same point: 
men have this common interest in preserving the stabil-
ity of property and thus that of society, this interest 
being motivated by a fear of falling into the state of 
nature. Yet this state is a mere (idle, philosophical) 
fiction. In the Inquiry, Hume again terms the pre-
social state (and the golden age) a philosophical fic-
tion, citing its use by Plato, Cicero, and Hobbes.' He 
softens, however, his statements in the Treatise 
concerning the possibility of such a state, stating the 
problem as "whether such a condition of human nature 
could ever exist or, if it did . . . ." and " . . . this 
must be admitted, that, if such a state of mutual war 
and violence ever was real . . . ." T But notice again, 
from the Inquiry, "(H)uman nature cannot, by any means, 
subsist without the association of individuals 
The problem that this inconsistency raises for Hume 
is a variant of the traditional problem of motivating 
just conduct, often discussed in the literature on 
Hume. The particular problem here is this: if the 
pre-social state of nature (taken especially in Hobbes' 
sense) is an idle, mere fiction, that did not and most 
importantly could not ever exist, then the individuals 
within a society cannot be motivated to just action by 
a fear of falling back into such a state. If, on the 
other hand, such a state is possible, or did exist, 
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then Hume's account of human nature is weakened. This 
is so because of the mixed nature of man: 
Human nature being compos'd of two principal 
parts, which are requisite in all its actions, 
the affections and understanding; 'tis certain 
that the blind actions of the former, without the 
direction of the latter (i.e., the condition of 
man in a Hobbesian state of nature], incapacitate 
men for society . . . .' 
It should be noted here that this passage immediately 
follows as an explanation of why the pre-social state 
of nature could never have existed. This apparently 
results in the dilemma that either Hume's account of 
human nature is wrong--or human nature has changed—or 
Hume's account of the motivation to individual just ac-
tion is empty. 
There are several possible routes out of this 
dilemma. Hume could maintain that it is the fear of 
the pre-social state that motivates individual just ac-
tions despite the fact that it is an unfounded fear— 
that is, that it is an idle but efficient fiction. 
Though this is possible, it puts the stability of 
society on shaky ground and, more importantly, it would 
force Hume to admit that the advantage pursued by man 
in avoidance of falling into the pre-social state is 
artificial, that it is the result of a fiction rather 
than the general sense of common interest. 
Another possible solution to the problem would be 
for Hume to claim that what is impossible is the 
Hobbesian war of all against all; what is feared by man 
is the primitive society of male, female and offspring 
without the regulation of property. This would solve 
the problem, but it is contrary to what Hume in fact 
says, as has been seen above. 
Frankly, it is very difficult to reconcile Hume's 
statements on this problem. This becomes evident when 
examining some of the commentaries on Hume's account of 
justice. J. Kemp, for example, glosses over the use of 
the "idle fiction" as a motivation by asserting that 
[Hume] argues that it is quite impossible for men 
to have existed for any length of time in such a 
condition [i.e., in a pre-social state]; the 
basic rule of justice is a very simple one and it 
is unthinkable that men should put up with the 
unstable conditions of an existence in which 
rules of property and justice are unheard of . . 
Indeed, it is unthinkable, and for Hume in the Treatise 
it is impossible. Kemp goes on to quite correctly as-
sert that Hume nonetheless allows the use of the 
concept as a philosophical fiction, in an analogical 
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argument linking the moral and natural sciences. This 
argument deserves examination. 
Hume, after the passage concerning the two princi-
pal parts of human nature, goes on to claim in defense 
of the fiction: 
And it may be allow 1d us to consider separately 
the effects [of the affections and understand-
ing], that result from the separate operations of 
these two component parts of the mind. The same 
liberty may be permitted to moral, which is 
allow*d to natural philosophers; and 'tis very 
usual with the latter to consider any motion as 
compounded and consisting of two parts separate 
from each other, tho' at the same time they ac-
knowledge it to be in itself uncompounded and 
inseparable. 1 1 
This argument, though subtle and plausible, will not 
work if the philosophical fiction is used as a 
motivation—as Hume wishes to use it. Though the move-
ment of, say, a horse from point A to point B is com-
pounded and may be considered in its parts, the philo-
sophical fiction of the pre-social state would require 
for its possibility a change in human nature (or its 
destruction), and thus the parts of human nature con-
sidered separately can . never serve to motivate just 
acts, unless Hume admits the possibility of a change in 
human nature. This seems unlikely. So Hume can con-
sider the pre-social state where man's nature is one-
dimensional, but this can never serve to inspire men to 
justice. 
Terence Penelhum differs from Kemp in his inter-
pretation of Hume on this pre-social state: 
Hume rejects the claim that there has ever been a 
historical (sic) period during which men lived in 
a state of nature as envisaged by Hobbes . . . 
12 
Initially recognizing the problem of reconciling the 
use of the philosophical fiction as Hume wants to use 
it, Penelhum finds the solution fairly simple: 
(The ideas of the state of nature and the golden 
age] merely show us why we need the conventions 
that we have when human nature is mixed in the 
way it is. 1 3 
This is surely true and consonant with Hume's descrip-
tive project. What Penelhum does not note is that Hume 
makes more use of the fiction than this. While the 
myths of the pre-social state show us why our conven-
tions are the way they are, they can never influence us 
in the original formation and continuation of civil 
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government, as it is impossible that we should ever 
return to this mythological pre-social state, due to 
the nature of human beings. And, of course, if the 
continuation of society and the rules of justice cannot 
be thus motivated, the natural question is: why 
should we be just as individuals? 
D. G. C. MacNabb provides a clear illustration of 
the confusion on this point. At one point he states 
that ". . . Hume infers that men can never have existed 
anywhere for any considerable time in 'that savage 
state which precedes society' . . . ." and then also 
states that "(TJhe lone savage, existing in Hobbes' 
state of war against all, is an abstraction who could 
scarce have been born or survived to maturity . 
." , % MacNabb finds this apparent inconsistency and 
Hume's use of the fiction relatively unproblematic. 
Whatever the outcome of this problem, it is a 
variant of and points to another aspect of Hume's ac-
count of justice that deserves attention. It is evi-
dent that some just acts will be contrary to the pri-
vate interests of the agent while not contrary to the 
general, public interest, and some just acts will be 
contrary to the public interest and beneficial to the 
private. Hume is required to show why individuals tend 
to promote the public interest over the private in 
cases where they clash, and why just acts apparently 
contrary to public interest are not in fact so opposed. 
One effort, just discussed, was to ascribe to men a 
fear of the collapse of society into a state of nature. 
The other, related, but more plausible way is to assert 
that, on the whole, individual interests are better 
furthered by adherence to the rules of justice, even 
when these rules seem contrary to the individual, pri-
vate interest. On the other hand, single acts follow-
ing from the rules of justice that appear contrary to 
public interest and beneficial to individual interest 
are seen as, on the whole, more conductive to the in-
terests of society, especially to that key interest for 
Hume—stability. With this account Hume cements the 
relation between justice and interest in a curious syn-
thesis of individual and public interest. After exa-
mining Hume'8 examples in detail, some criticisms will 
be offered of Hume's explanation. 
Hume states: 
A single act of justice is frequently contrary to 
public interest; and were it to stand alone, 
without being follow'd by other acts may, in it-
self, be very prejudicial to society. When a man 
of merit . . . restores a great fortune to a 
miser, or a seditious bigot, he has acted justly 
and laudably, but the public is a real sufferer. 
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and 
Nor is every single act of justice, consider'd 
apart, more conductive to private interest, than 
to public; and 'tis easily conceiv'd how such a 
man may impoverish himself by a signal instance 
of integrity, and have reason to wish, that with 
regard to that single act, the laws of justice 
were for a moment suspended in the universe. 1' 
This being a very great problem for any system of 
justice based on interest, Hume offers the following 
solution: 
But however single acts of justice may be con-
trary, either to public or private interest, 'tis 
certain, that the whole plan or scheme is highly 
conducive, or indeed absolutely requisite, both 
to the support, and the well-being of every 
individual. 'Tis impossible to separate the good 
from the ill. Property must be stable, and must 
be fix'd by general rules. 1' 
One of the most interesting and insightful cri-
tiques of Hume's position here is that put forward by 
Barry Stroud. 1 7 Stroud asks us to consider a man, call 
him John, who is deciding whether to join a society 
based on the rules of justice. John may recognize the 
necessity of the existence of these rules in order to 
preserve stability, in property and thus in society. 
John is human, however, and thus partial to his own in-
terests and to those of his friends and relatives. 
Moreover, John is fairly intelligent. He recognizes 
that society will not collapse should he act to serve 
his interests and those of his friends and relatives 
all of the time; justly, when justice coincides with 
his interests, unjustly when they diverge. Even when 
John admits that the rules of justice are to be univer-
sally binding in order to preserve society, still on 
Hume's account of human nature he may legitimately ask 
why he should act against his own interests when 
society is not directly threatened, as it rarely if 
ever is. He could still support the enforcement of the 
laws of justice as far as others are concerned, while 
acting solely in his own interests. This requires only 
the sacrifice of ethical consistency, but Hume's ac-
count does not make this sort of consistency neces-
sary. *" 
Stroud'8 example is admittedly improbable in its 
extreme character, but in fact history is dotted with 
such characters. The most notable example appears to 
be the Marquis de Sade, who while championing the order 
of justice for others, almost unreservedly followed his 
own interests. For a part of his life, when he was 
relatively immune from punishment, it was in his own 
interest to be quite unjust. Eventually, of course, 
Sade did suffer, and this may be a point in Hume's 
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favor, though I think not. For as Stroud mentions,*' 
one could amend the example so that John is intelligent 
enough to take all pains in order to convince the rest 
of society that he does act justly, while secretly fol-
lowing his own interests. If he can do this with rea-
sonable security, then the rules of justice on Hume's 
account hold little appeal for him, and thus Hume's 
descriptive account may fail. 
Hume has two possible answers to Stroud's 
criticism. The first, that men consider and fear the 
possibility of a fall into barbarism in weighing their 
courses of action, has been seen to be rife with 
difficulties. The second answer is that individuals 
are rewarded for action justly in the long run, that 
is, " . . . every individual must find himself a gainer, 
on ballancing the account . . . . The just act con-
trary to private interest thus only seems contrary to 
private interest, as ultimately those interests will be 
furthered. Likewise, just acts contrary to public 
interest only seem to be so, and in the end public in-
terest is furthered. Hume here effects his curious 
synthesis of public and private interest. Unfortunate-
ly, this only seems to solve his problem. As Stroud 
says, 
. . this is really no better than the view al-
ready found to be inadequate (i.e., the view that 
John embraces the rules of justice due to a 
recognition of interest]. What compensates for 
the evil resulting from individual acts of 
justice is presumably the greater security in 
preserving our goods which society provides. To 
reject justice, Hume argues, is to reject all the 
advantages of society. But the only way this 
could help explain an individual person's ap-
proval of, or motivation for, being just on a 
particular occasion is if, as Hume puts it, 'even 
every individual person must find himself a 
gainer, on ballancing the account'. And what 
reason is there to suppose that it is so? 2 1 
Put quite bluntly, there is no reason to suppose that 
individuals will, in the long run, be compensated for 
forsaking their interests for the interests of justice 
and the public good. Even if some sort of equalization 
does occur, Hume still has not accounted for just ac-
tion, as in our example John may choose to perform a 
particular unjust action of the well-justified belief 
that the rest of society, ignorant of his action, will 
not follow suit and thus justice and society will be 
preserved. 
Another of Stroud's examples provides a striking 
rejoinder to Hume. If each person in fact approves of 
the rules of justice because he or she recognizes the 
eventual furthering of their private interests by doing 
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so, then each criminal, should he think hard enough, 
would approve of his prison sentence as in the long run 
furthering his interests in some way; for example, by 
facilitating his integration into society at a later 
date after his rehabilitation. This is at least 
plausible. What private interest can possibly be fur-
thered in the long run, when the criminal is sentenced 
to death?" 
In either of the two routes Hume takes to explain 
the nature of individual just acts problems are 
encountered. This is not because Hume fails to provide 
normative, prescriptive guidelines; this is not his 
task nor does he claim it to be. Rather, Hume's ac-
count is weak because he fails to adequately describe 
how it is that justice works in society. 
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